The A.E. Havens Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA. September 26-28, 1997.
Background Paper by Cees J. Hamelink, professor of international communication at the University of Amsterdam, director of the Centre for Communication & Human Rights (Amsterdam), and initiator of the People's Communication Charter.
Contents.
Part I. The background and rationale for the PCC-movement.
I. 1. The lessons from the NIIO project.
I. 2. The cultural environment: disempowerment and empowerment.
I. 3. Communication ethics for users.
I. 4. Human rights obligations of individuals.
Part II. The emergence and evolution of the Charter. Its current status.
III. 1. The strategic issues.
These address by and large the question how civil society organisations
can effectively impact (inter)national governance. These issues need a
good deal of discussion. I will merely outline them here to put them on
the conference agenda.
III. 2. The substantive issues.
These deal primarily with the basic choice that the initiators of the Charter
made for its moral framework. This is largely inspired by the international
human rights regime. In essence the Charter aims at the implementation
of a basic right to communicate. This moral choice is not without difficulties
and it is essential to confront the limits of "rights talk".
The major sources of inspiration for the PCC-movement are the lessons from
the NIIO project, the threats to the cultural environment, the moral responsibilities
of those who constitute the publics of old and new media, and the individual
duties under international human rights law.
I. 1. The lessons from the NIIO project.
During the 1970s a coalition of politicians, media activists, and communication
researchers committed itself to the creation of a "new international
information and communication order". The coalition aspired towards
a new order that would be democratic, that would support economic development,
enhance the international exchange of ideas, share knowledge among all
the people of the world, and improve the quality of life.
This aspiration was first publicly expressed through a meeting of Non-Aligned
Heads of State in 1973 at Algiers. This meeting started a project that
-after several years of much commotion and anger and little concrete achievement-
would again disappear from the world's political agenda.
An analysis of the failure of the NIIO project to democratize world communication
is essential for an understanding of the motives behind the People's Communication
Charter.
Among the various factors that contributed to the NIIO failure the most
critical one was the lack of people's participation.
The effort to democratize communication in the 1970s was never a very democratic
process. The debate was mainly an exchange among statal and commercial
actors. Ordinary people were not on the playing field. The whole project
was engineered by political and intellectual elites. There was little or
no thinking about people's interests, even less about the need to involve
ordinary people in the debate.
The NIIO debate was firmly rooted in the realist paradigm of international
relations. This conceived the world as a state-centric system and failed
to take serious account of the numerous nonstate actors that had become
essential forces in world politics.
As a result the NIIO debate never explicitly promoted the notion that the
effective protection of democratic rights could not be guaranteed under
the conventional nation-state system.
A critical problem was that the realist paradigm glossed over the internal
dimension of state sovereignty while focusing on external factors. As a
result, the nation-state was seen as protecting the liberties of its citizenry
against external claims made by other states. However, the outwardly sovereign
state tends to appropriate also sovereign control over its citizens in
the process. This follows the Hobbesian vision in which only the absolute
sovereignty of the state (the Leviathan) can control the eternal strife
amomg civil actors.
This position ignores that state sovereignty represents more than the emancipation
from the powers of emperors, popes and nobility.
The development of legitimate sovereign states went together with the
development of egalitarianism in which subjects became citizens. The French
revolution and the American revolution gave birth to both independent nation-states
as well as to citizens with basic civil rights. As a matter of fact the
French revolution recognized the primacy of the people's sovereignty.
This recognition was not taken up in the NIIO project. It was not a people's
movement. In so far as it aspired towards a democratic order, it was a
"democratization from above".
Just like the NIIO project, to-day's popular project for the construction
of a Global Information Infrastructure (GII) is steered by the interests
and stakes of governments and corporations. It is the bilateral playing
field of "Princes" and "Merchants", and ordinary people
are occasionally addressed as citizens or consumers, but they play no essential
role.
A concern for the GII elite is actually that people may not be as exited
about the digital future as they are. It may be that ordinary men and women
are not eagerly waiting to believe that virtual reality can resolve the
problems of their daily lives.
Therefore, many of the official reports on the Information Society stress
the need to promote awareness among consumers. A key concern of the constructors
of the information superhighway is that consumers may be hesitant about
adding digital services to the present media supply, certainly if they
have to pay for it.
The GII project therefore needs to persuade people that the information
society will bring them great improvements in life style, comfort, and
general well-being. This makes people important targets for propaganda
and marketing. There is however no serious involvement of people's movements
in the making of the GII. There are no trilateral negotiations between
governments, industrialists and social movements to share decision making
on our preferred common future. Like the project of the 1970s the GII project
is about "democratization-from above" and doomed to fail in making
world communication more democratic.
I. 2. The cultural cnvironment: disempowerment and empowerment.
Today we observe -across the world- that people face pervasive worldwide
governmental and commercial censorship, distorted and misleading information,
stereotyped and damaging images of the human condition with respect to
gender, age, race, ethnicity, sexuality, physical and mental illness and
disability, restricted access to knowledge, and insufficient channels to
communicate diverse ideas and opinions.
The reality of the cultural environment reduces the capacity of ordinary
men and women to control the choices that others make about their lives.
This "disempowerment" violates the human entitlement to respect
for his/her inalienable dignity.
Against this, an "empowerment" perspective implies the need to
shape the cultural environment in accordance with the basic standards of
equality (non-discrimination), inviolability (protection of human integrity),
and liberty (the protection of human self-determination).
This is a tall order. The info-communications domain is an arena largely
controlled by very powerful interests. The media moguls and their political
friends will not voluntarily put their stakes at risk. The information
industries, the telecommunication operators and their large clients, the
intellectual property industries and the supporting governments are not
likely to act against the disempowering impact of current flows of information.
The much heralded GII-project, for example, seriously threatens people's
informational self-determination as a result of the censorship that will
be exercised by mega gatekeepers. As the new technologies mature, the largest
players are preparing themselves for the interactive possibilities of digital
networks. The Hollywood majors and companies like Time Warner and News
Corporation are getting ready for grand investments to ride the information
superhighway.
As the Information Superhighway project is to be privately funded and commercially
driven by the market there needs to be a system that defines what services
the consumer will get, that charges consumers for what they get and shuts
out those who cannot pay. If major companies invest billions of dollars
in the Information Superhighway they will want control of access to consumers
so they can recoup these investments.
The Internet -at present a public meeting place where more than 30 million
PC users in some 150 countries exchange information, search databases,
play games and chat- is beginning to attract the attention of the international
business community. The Internet has been guided by the rule of sharing
information for free and has now been discovered as a major vehicle for
commercial advertising. A communicative structure that so far has been
public, non-commercial, non regulated, non-censored, anarchistic and very
pluralistic may soon turn into a global electronic shopping mall.
Al Gore, US Vice-President and the prime spokesman for the GII-project,
has repeatedly expressed the expectation that this privately funded project
will foster an "Athenian democracy". Although the reference to
classic Athens may have been made in ignorance, it is a very significant
statement. The pluralism of a market-driven GII may indeed reflect Athenian
democracy: a highly exclusive system that left most people (such as slaves
and women) out.
If a market-driven arrangement is -for some time to come- the standard
environment in which mass media -conventional and
new-operate, then a pluralist, and sustainable cultural environment cannot
be expected from monopoly providers, or competitive providers, or from
regulators of whatever persuasion.
Within the scenario of a market-driven playing field, the only force that can make a real difference are the buyers on the market. The responsibility for a cultural environment that respects human dignity cannot be left to the "Princes and Merchants". Its ultimate defense lies with the forces of civil society, the people themselves.
Whether more voices will be heard, ultimately depends upon whether people
want to listen to these voices. The essence of censorship -the gravest
threat to pluralism- is not just with those who censor but also with those
who consent.
Censorship during the Gulf war was not only effective because it was so
cleverly orchestrated, but because so many people supported it and preferred
ignorance over information and one-sidedness over pluralism.
In most societies people are at present not seriously concerned about the
quality of their cultural environment. People are more worried about the
killing of whales than about the disappearance of minority languages.
However, since the cultural environment is as essential to humankind's
common future as the natural ecology, it is time that people's movements
should focus on the organisation and quality of the production and distribution
of information and other cultural expressions.
If people refuse to be silenced, if they do not want to live with a massive
choreography of televised violence, or if they do not want to be surrounded
by electronic surveillance and political propaganda, they cannot trust
states and markets to accommodate their information needs. They will have
to take responsibility themselves. In the end the quality of the cultural
environment is not determined by the media moguls or the regulators but
by the community of media users.
I. 3. Communication ethics for users.
Media ethics is a booming field of academic inquiry and practical debate.
Most work in this field focuses on the media producers.
From such early classics as Merrill and Barney (1975) to more recent studies
by Christians, Ferré, and Fackler (1993), most books on media ethics
deal with the resolution of moral dilemmas media producers face in the
execution of their profession.
The existing codes of professional ethics address the rights and wrongs
of the professional producers.
Explorations of media morality (such as reported in the Journal of Mass
Media Ethics) almost exclusively deal with the moral problems of the messengers
and their messages.
Many journalists' bodies have adopted codes of ethics for the self-regulation
of professional conduct. Press Councils around the world deliberate and
judge the standards by which producers behave.
A key concern of this producer-centred activity in media ethics is the
quest for professional freedom, quality, and responsibility in media performance.
However laudable all the efforts in the field of professional ethics
may be, they leave the issues of freedom, quality and responsibility the
sole concern of the professional.
This is odd since professions imply necessarily relationships between professionals
and clients.
In most professional codes there are provisions that deal with this
relationship. Professionals are expected to respect the autonomy of their
clients, to avoid abuse of the vulnerable position of the client, to fully
and honestly inform the client, to maintain the confidentiality of the
communication, and to act with expertise and carefulness.
The client is present in the prescriptions for professional conduct since
(as in most journalistic codes) the obligations of the professional are
based upon the rights to which the clients are entitled. A perspective
shared by many professional codes is that since clients have the right
to receive opinions, information and ideas, they should be properly informed
about matters of public interest. This relation with the clients has been
forcefully endorsed by several judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights. The jurisprudence of the Court states that not only do the mass
media have a right to impart information, they also have the responsibility
"to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest",
and the public has a right to receive such information and ideas. The Court
has ruled that the media are both purveyor of information and public watchdog.
(Barthold case, 1985; Sunday Times case 1991; Observer/Guardian case, 1991;
Open Door case, 1992).
This matches with a classical opinion of the US Supreme Court in "Red
Lion Broadcasting versus the FCC" in 1969, where the Court stated
that "the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of broadcasters
is paramount".
All this attention paid to the client is, however, still a rather one-sided
approach to the relationship. It would seem more accurate to perceive of
the professional-client relation as an interactive process which depends
upon a mutual commitment. This implies that also the client actively contributes
to the professional performance.
Some twenty five years ago Wilbur Schramm addressed this in a chapter on
responsibilities of the government, the media, and the public. Schramm
pointed to a shared responsibility for the quality of mass communication
by public regulatory bodies, the media themselves, and the general public.
"The listening, viewing, reading public underestimates its power"
(Rivers &;Schramm, 1969: 249), Schramm wrote, and he suggested the
need for alert and discriminating audiences.
More recently, in a book written from the practitioner's experience, Mort
Rosenblum took up the notion of shared responsibility for the quality of
international reporting.
Current world news leaves us with enormous gaps in our knowledge about
the world and Rosenblum blames this on media managers who are obsessed
with ratings and earnings and who prefer entertainment over information.
But he also blames the correspondents who distort the facts and fall victim
to the pollsters and the PR firms. Rosenblum provides many illustrations
of how the professionals fail. However, he also includes the general public
in his analysis of the problem, "If the suppliers have not done better,
it is because consumers have not demanded it....If surgeons or plumbers
foul up, they are sued. But who asks about the people who presume to be
covering the world? Customers howl when a merchant does them wrong. Why
do newspeople get off so easily?" (Rosenblum, 1993: 287).
If one accepts the interactive character of the professional client relationship, it follows that media ethics cannot be limited to the rights and wrongs of the producers only and should also be ethics for media users. The case for user ethics can be defended by demonstrating that not only producers but also users face moral choices in connection with media freedom, quality and responsibility. Such choices come about when users are faced with situations in which alternative paths of action are available that represent different values. Actually, moral choices imply preferences for a type of action that is awarded a higher value than a possible alternative.
Users and freedom.
Restrictions on media freedom are often the combined efforts of censors,
collaborative media producers and consenting users. As observed earlier,
during the Gulf war people were kept ignorant, but many also preferred
to remain ignorant.
Ronald Dworkin observed in this context, "Truth may be the first casualty
of war, but some people's desire to be told the truth is a close second"
(Dworkin. 1991: 2). This could be supported by the finding that nearly
eight out of ten Americans supported the Pentagon restrictions on the press
and six said that the military should exert more control. Eight out of
ten said the press did an excellent job and over 60% thought the press
coverage was accurate [1].
The war demonstrated that official censorship, journalistic self-censorship,
and the users' refusal to be informed reinforced each other. The complicity
of users was an essential component in the reduction of freedom of media
performance.
In cases such as war reporting, users can actively or passively support
censorship or act against it by monitoring mainstream media, raise censorship
issues in local media, join anti censorship groups, start anti-censorship
campaigns, or boycott products from censors.
Another example comes from the situation in 1940 when most Dutch newspapers decided to continue their operations, despite censorship, propaganda, disinformation and the silencing of Jewish journalists by the Nazi regime. They made the moral choice that continuity of the newspaper scored higher on their scale of moral values than resistance and going underground. It should be remembered that most of the readers made the same choice and were equally responsible for a situation which was difficult to morally justify. Choices were made by both professionals and clients.
The widespread practice of governmental and corporate secrecy provides yet another illustration of possible user complicity in reducing access to information. This can be very harmful as it hampers people's understanding and blocks the knowledge of alternatives. If consumers condone the withholding of information about matters that affect their well-being, they themselves fail their duty to inquire about what governments and major corporations (for example in nuclear technology, automobile manufacturing, or chemical waste production) are doing.
Most people who want access to this type of information have to rely upon the mass media as professional intermediaries. This implies that they have to monitor whether media indeed fulfil this mediating role. They also have to contribute to the necessary conditions for the mass media to do so, for example by providing popular support for the protection of editorial independence.
When users feel very strongly about certain moral issues and expect the professionals to confirm their preferences, they may be tempted to exercise pressure on editorial policies . This can easily lead to populist censorship that interferes with editorial independence. Users have to decide whether their occasional moral panic about media's anti-social contents is justified. They have to question whether harmful acts result from these contents and whether the perceived harm is so serious that it warrants the attempt at censorship.
Users and quality.
We can observe across the world that ordinary people have begun to
take responsibility for the quality of their primary, natural environment.
The ecological movement demonstrates this quite convincingly. This active
concern about human conduct in relation to all forms of non-human life,
is a moral choice people make. Largely in response to the primary, natural
environment human beings create a secondary environment. This is the human-made
cultural environment in which the mass media are crucial tools.
One could argue that also the degree of concern vis-à-vis this secondary
environment is a matter of moral choice. If people withdraw from this concern,
they make the choice not to take responsibility for its quality.
It could well be that the degree of people's concern about the cultural
environment represents one of the most critical moral questions of our
civilization.
Users and responsibility
In a variety of situations, media users can become important sources
of media reporting. This raises questions for the way they behave. Users
can provide honest or deceptive accounts.
They can act as unreliable sources who confidently make claims about areas
about which they have no knowledge or who overdramatize the events they
have witnessed. Users can offer their information for free or they can
try to make a profit and accept payment for an exclusive story. The latter
practice of "chequebook journalism" is currently on the rise.
People are offered a good deal of money if they reveal personal secrets.
The practice whereby the highest bidder acquires exclusive claims to a
story, violates the principle of the freedom to gather information. It
also raises serious questions about privacy protection since the information
offered often concerns other people's private lives.
An irresponsible practice, such as the distribution of deceptive information,
is an issue for both the deceiver and the deceived. Being deceived implies
disempowerment and loss of autonomy. This is however not the sole responsibility
of the messenger.
Autonomy is not an ideal located somewhere outside us and dependent
upon whether an external agent grants it.
Rephrasing a statement by Paolo Freire we could say that it is the task
of the deceived to liberate themselves and their deceivers. (Freire, 1972:
21).
In more and more countries media users have the legal possibility to use a right of reply. This right has also been incorporated into the Council of Europe's Convention on Transborder Television (1989, Article 8). Users will have to question to what extent this right should be used. There are examples where it has been deployed to take up large portions of media space/time for self-seeking purposes. Users should question whether this is a responsible attitude.
Responsibility also implies that media users actively demand accountability from the media producers. This confronts them with the choice for or against active participation in citizen organizations that monitor media performance or in representative policy making bodies in the media.
Media-user initiatives.
There is presently an increasing number of initiatives around the world
through which ordinary people begin to express a concern about mass media
performance. Examples include the following initiatives.
The Friends of Canadian Broadcasting which is since 1985 a constituency
of advocates for public broadcasting representing over 36,000 families.
The Charter of Rights of Television Viewers drawn up by the French Association
of Television Viewers in 1991. The Charter of Television Viewer's Rights
proposed by the Japanese Forum for Citizen's TV in 1992. The Communication,
Information and Networking Alternative Treaty which was signed by non governmental
organizations during the 1992 UNCED in Rio de Janeiro and which stated
among other provisions the right of all people to communicate, to collect,
to disseminate and to exchange all information they choose. The Charter
for the Reader adopted by the International Book Committee in 1992. The
Voice of the Listener and Viewer Society which held an international conference
in London in April 1993 attended by 125 representatives from 40 countries.
The Declaration entitled "Responsibility in a Media-based Society"
which was adopted by a working group of the European Television and Film
Forum in January 1994 at Düsseldorf. This TV consumer's declaration
was drawn up as an expression of the needs and interests of viewers and
addresses a more active role of consumers in relation to TV. The Declaration
on New Technologies and the Democratisation of Audiovisual Communication
adopted by the participants of the 1994 International Symposium convened
by Vidéazimut and CENDIT in New Delhi, India.
The US-based Cultural Environment Movement which is a non-profit corporation that builds a broad constituency and takes lessons from the environment movement in creating a freer, fairer and more diverse cultural environment. The movement forms a coalition of media, professional, labour, religious, environmental, health-related, and women's and minority groups working for liberation on the cultural front.
The initiative to launch the People's Communication Charter is very much part of these efforts to adopt and enforce standards for the quality of information provision and cultural production.
The present attempts to mobilize media users mainly address what governments
and broadcasting organisations should do and what rights users have. This
is undoubtedly very important in a process of awareness raising about the
need for active participation of audiences in the improvement of media
quality and the democratization of media programme policy and management.
However, claims to the representation of viewers' needs and interests in
TV broadcasting and to the representation of television consumers' interests
in processes of media legislation, could be self-defeating if they do not
recognize implications for the conduct of the users themselves.
Media use should be viewed, like professional media performance, as a social
practice which implies moral choices and the assumption of accountability
for these choices.
Media users can obviously not be coerced into the exercise of ethical
inquiry. This is a voluntary project and it be could asked why one would
expect users to actually care about moral choice in connection with their
use of the media.
A provisional answer points to three considerations.
Firstly, it can be argued that for many people who are already committed
to a concern about media performance, it may be a relatively small step
from their current narrow focus on other actors, to include their own role
as well.
Secondly, it may well be that a growing number of media users has a latent
concern about media performance, for example parents about incessant volumes
of violence, but has not yet found concrete articulation or platforms of
expression.
Thirdly, it would not seem unrealistic to expect, based upon experiences
in other areas of life, that this latent concern can be used to generate
an active interest in user ethics among numerous civil groups and individuals.
It should also be stressed that media ethics is part of the broader
moral inquiry into the state of the human being. In recent years this has
acquired a particular urgency since the mass media are in the forefront
of confronting us with the historical reality of "dehumanization"
at a grand scale and therefore with the question about the possibility
of "humanization".
In this quandary two positions offer themselves as obvious and convenient
solutions.
The cynical position makes all moral reasoning meaningless because it views
dehumanization as the only historical reality. This position borders on
moral indifference.
The fundamentalist position accepts only one mould of humanity and elevates
its particularist moral bias to universal principle. This position borders
on moral terror.
To meet the challenge of avoiding both extreme positions, the joint
effort of media producers and media users is required.
This needs a communicative type of media-ethics that engages both professionals
and users in an open-ended, public and free inquiry into some of the most
crucial moral choices of our time.
The People's Communication Charter was initiated as a common frame of reference
for such inquiry.
I.4. Human rights obligations of individuals.
An essential source of inspiration for the People's Communication Charter
are those standards of international law that provide a rationale for the
systematic monitoring of media contents.
"Media monitoring" is an instrument to expose the quality of
current media materials, to judge these materials by some common standard
of achievement, and to contribute to an improvement of media performance
in line with this standard. The essential question thus is whether such
a common standard is available and whether the standard implies an obligation
to contribute to its achievement.
It would be a rather obvious reasoning that since media affect people's
lives in many different ways, they may be expected to serve people's interests.
As McQuail writes, " The existence of some kind and degree of public
interest in the operation of mass media has clearly been widely accepted,
and it has much to do with the rise of democracy and of a 'public sphere',
in which opinions are formed and expressed by citizens on the basis of
common knowledge and of widely held values" (McQuail, 1992: 4).
A complex problem with the notion of 'people's interest' is that this is
not an unequivocal category that is expressed in a singular way at a clearly
identifiable forum. Therefore, we have to infer people's interest from
an identifiable set of standards upon which all people can agree. This
would seem almost impossible given that in a multicultural world with multi
layered societies people will have divided interests and will make different
preferential normative choices. However, despite the temptations of normative
relativism and the justified suspicion about unitary value judgments, it
is possible to infer people's interests from universally accepted standards.
These are the standards of international human rights. Human rights provide
currently the only available set of standards for the dignity and integrity
of all people. It is in the interest of all people that they be respected
(Hamelink, 1994: 58).
In the international human rights regime we find several standards which can be used in the assessment of media performance. Although these standards address the protection of individuals against state practices, it would be unreasonable to accept that whereas states should grant these rights and enforce these prohibitions, private parties could ignore them.
The individual responsibility vis-à-vis the defense of human
rights receives an extra dimension in view of the observation that human
rights are not violated by state institutions only. They are also under
threat from other social actors, such as families, tribes, enterprises,
and ordinary individuals.
Women's rights are in many countries grossly violated within the family.
Discrimination, cruelty and violence often take place within family relations.
The place where people should learn first about the respect for others
is often the prime locus of violence against others.
Human rights are effectively threatened by the people themselves; e.g.
when majorities limit the rights of minorities. Whenever in the world innocent
civilians are killed, tortured, raped, this often happens with the silent
consent if not active participation of other 'innocent' civilians. Ironically,
often the poor who violate the human rights of other destitute people.
Human Rights Standards.
There is a general standard of achievement (in the Preamble of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights) that relates to the expectation that "every
individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly
in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for
these rights and freedoms...".
This is repeated in the preambular paragraphs of both the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with the phrasing that the individual
"is under a responsibility to strive to the promotion and observance
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant".
The implied task for media monitoring is to evaluate whether media contents
contribute to the teaching of respect for human rights.
In addition to this general norm, there are ten more specific standards. These are the following.
It is a logical conclusion from the foregoing, that there is a public
responsibility to monitor whether media performance measures up against
the human rights standards that international law proposes. Any exercise
in media monitoring would therefore, investigate carefully and methodically
whether media contents satisfy the human rights standards mentioned above.
Media monitoring is thus an exercise in the defense of human rights. It
represents the duty of individuals under international human rights law
to remind the media of the human rights standards their performance should
meet.
The duty of individuals under international human rights law.
The recognition of individual rights under international law is linked with the notion that individuals also have duties under international law. This was eloquently expressed in 1947 by Mahatma Gandhi in a letter to the director of UNESCO about the issue of human rights. Gandhi wrote, "I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother that rights to be deserved and preserved came from duty well done".
A fundamental provision in international human rights law that pertains
to duties for individuals is contained in Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
"Everyone has duties to the community".
This idea is reinforced by the fifth preambular paragraphs in both the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with the provision
that "the individual having duties to other individuals and to the
community to which he belongs...".
The regional conventions in the Americas and in Africa recognize explicitly
that individuals have duties under human rights law.
In its preamble, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) argues that "The fulfilment of duty by each individual is a prerequisite to the rights of all. Rights and duties are interrelated in every social and political activity of man. While rights exalt individual liberty, duties express the dignity of that liberty".
The American Convention on Human Rights in Article 32.1. states that "Every person has responsibilities to his family, his community, and mankind".
The African Charter on Human and People's Rights refers in Part I to
Rights and Duties and elaborates this in chapter II. Article 27.1. states,
"Every individual shall have duties towards his family and society,
the State and other legally recognised communities and the international
community". Article 28 provides that "Every individual shall
have the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination,
and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing
mutual respect and tolerance".
Article 29 proposes eight paragraphs with specific duties the individual
has. Among these are "To preserve and strengthen positive African
cultural values in his relations with other members of the society, in
the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general, to
contribute to the promotion of the moral well being of society".
Also the draft Charter of Asian Human Rights refers to the notion of duty when it mentions (in its Introduction) the human rights demands that are imposed upon states and then proposes that "The community as a whole has a primary obligation to see that the State comply with these demands".
For many centuries only states were subjects of international law. In the 20th century this approach began to shift with the judgments of the war tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second World War. The judges of these tribunals established that individuals have criminal liability under international law. The Nuremberg tribunal stated on 1 October 1946, "Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced".
In international human rights law duties are implied in the reciprocal
character of rights. The granting of a certain right to a person implies
that he/she treats other human beings in line with the same right. Claims
to the protection by human rights imply the commitment that violations
of these rights are rejected and that the rights holders engage in the
defense of such rights.
An appeal to a right implies that violations of this right are not tolerated
and this constitutes a general duty to defend basic human rights.
If we accept the notion of the individual's duties under international
law, this will have implications for the performance of individuals in
relation to the mass media.
In the lives of many people the media constitute a forum for public exchange,
provide entertainment and education, and mediate between them and the events
outside their direct observation.
If the international human rights regime does propose a set of standards
for media producers, it equally does so for media users or for those who
exercise media-watching as part of their academic tasks.
International human rights law sets standards for media performance. It
is the individual's duty to promote human rights and therefore his/her
responsibility to ensure the media meet these standards. In order for individuals
to meet this obligation, systematic and reliable media monitoring needs
to be conducted by communication scholars so as to provide media clients
with the information they need about media performance.
It is crucial that this information is collected through serious and academic
investigation rather than haphazardly and intuitively lest media criticism
lacks all credibility.
If one accepts the interactive character of the professional client
relationship, it follows that concerns about media performance cannot be
limited to the agenda of the producers only and should also be the responsibility
of media users.
The agenda for this responsibility could be constituted from those individual's
duties -under international law- that directly connect with media performance.
In addition to the duties related to human rights, international law defines
certain general duties for the individual and in pursuit of these duties
it makes sense to monitor media performance in areas of individual responsibility.
Among these areas are the following.
The PCC and international law.
The People's Communication Charter strongly reflects the conviction
that individuals have certain obligations under international law. Some
of these individual duties have important implications for people's responsibility
vis-à-vis their cultural environment.
The Charter does not necessarily formulate new normative standards for
individual and collective civil action. It explicitly articulates such
standards as aspirations that people themselves adopt as guidance.
The People's Communication Charter is an initiative of the Third World
Network (Penang, Malaysia), the Centre for Communication &;Human Rights
(Amsterdam, the Netherlands), the Cultural Environment Movement (USA),
and the AMARC-World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (Peru/Canada).
In the early 1990s, academics and activists associated with the Third World
Network (TWN) in Penang and its affiliated Consumers Association of Penang
(CAP) initiated a debate on the feasibility of a world people's movement
in the field of communication and culture.
The TWN and CAP had by then already an impressive record with the development
of people's movements in such areas as international trade and the tropical
rain forest. They had proved capable of bringing the concerns of grass
roots people in Third World countries to the diplomatic negotiations of
the Uruquay GATT multilateral trade round and the UNCED in Rio de
Janeiro.
An obvious problem turned out to be that information consumers are not
normally organized in representative associations.
They are a diverse community, geographically dispersed and ideologically
fragmented. In order to create a constituency for concerns about the quality
of the cultural environment, the People's Communication Charter was initiated
as a first step.
The Charter was to provide the common framework for all those who share
the belief that people should be active and critical
participants in their social reality and capable of governing themselves.
The Charter was conceived as a first step in the development of a permanent
movement concerned with the quality of the cultural environment.
One of the ideas that was launched at the early stages of the Charter's
development, was the organisation of an International Tribunal that would
receive complaints by signatories of the Charter and invite the parties
involved to submit evidence and defense upon which the Tribunal could come
to a judgment.
From the beginnig it was clear that the Charter should not be seen as
an end in itself.
It intends to provide the basis for a permanent critical reflection on
those worldwide trends that determine the quality of our lives in the third
millennium.
It is therefore important to see the Charter as an open document that can
always be updated, amended, improved, and expanded.
As a matter of fact since the Charter was presented on the World Wide Web
(http://www.waag.org/pcc), new ideas and suggestions for changes have been
proposed and discussed.
A very important moment in the PCC history was the Founding Convention
of the Cultural Environment Movement (St. Louis, March 1996) when the first
public ratification of the text took place. Recently, in June 1997, the
governing body of the World Association for Christian Communication has
endorsed the Charter. This was the conclusion of much discussion of the
Charter by WACC members in its eight regions. The WACC Central Committee
also proposed some important amendments to the text.
Next year the Charter will be on the agenda of the General Assembly of
AMARC and of the Paris Convention of the Cultural Environment Movement
in April. For the United Nations celebration of the 50th anniversary of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (in December 1998) initiatives
are being developed to secure some form of acclaim for the Charter from
the international political community.
Most importantly, however, is at present to solicit more support for the
ideas that the Charter embodies from individuals and institutions worldwide.
In August 1997, for example, the Charter was displayed at the famous Dokumenta
exhibition at Kassel, Germany. The text was discussed and signed by many
visitors.
The Web site of the Charter is the place where such events and the progress
in widening support for the PCC are made public.
Beyond the text itself and its endorsement, the most critical element for
the Charter's future is obviously its implementation.
In an open, democratic, people's movement this cannot be organized by some
central governing body. Implementation is very much the concern of local
and national groups, either newly formed or already established for other
(or similar) purposes.
The realisation of the people's right to communicate cannot be a homogeneous
project. This will take different forms in different socio-cultural and
political contexts. In one country this may be the institution of an Ombudsman
office for the quality of the cultural environment, in another country
a national prize may be awarded for the TV programme people find most in
violation of the Charter's principles, in some place a civil society campaign
to rescue public broadcasting may be necessary, somewhere else the focus
may on the protection of children or the defense of the media interests
of people with a handicap. This is really the business of ordinary people.
It is also the ultimate test case for the significance of the Charter.
The whole initiative in the end only makes sense if people themselves begin
to be concerned about its implementation.
These issues by and large address the question how civil society organisations
(CSOs) can effectively impact (inter)national governance.
These issues need a good deal of discussion. I will merely outline them
here to put them on the conference agenda.
Representativeness: Who are the Constituencies?
A vital issue for all civil society organisations is the question whom
they represent? Can they speak on behalf of a constituency? Do members
of that constituency recognize the organisation(s) as legitimate representatives?
Is there a democratic process by which constituencies can channel their
concerns? Do CSOs account for their operations vis-à-vis their constituencies?
Implied issues for the PCC-movement:
Much of the lobbying activity of CSOs has traditionally been directed towards
governments and state institutions. Is this still relevant in the present
international reality where most real decision making that affects people's
daily lives is the domain of transnational business actors? There have
been important recent cases where social activists have directly targeted
major companies for their campaigns (cf Green Peace versus Shell).
Does this represent an important shift in the orientation of CSOs?
Implied issues for the PCC-movement:
III. 1.4. Access to decision making bodies.
In the past decades the CSO community has achieved some success in its
involvement in the decision making process of major intergovernmental organisations.
International NGOs have managed to get observer and advisory status in
many of the UN special agencies.
Implied issues for the PCC-movement:
III. 1.5. Increasing impact through ICTs?
For many CSOs the access to and use of new Information &;Communication
Technologies has become an important factor in the efficiency and effectiveness
of their campaigns. A good illustration provided the use of electronic
networking by those NGOs that mobilized social activism around the UN Beijing
Conference on Women in 1995.
Implied issues for the PCC-movement:
III. 2. THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.
These issues deal primarily with the basic choice that the initiators of the Charter made for its moral framework. This is largely inspired by the international human rights regime. In essence the Charter aims at the implementation of a basic "right to communicate". This moral choice is not without difficulties and it is essential to confront the limits of "rights talk".
III.2.1. The Right to Communicate.
The recognition of a right to communicate 'for all people' would be
the corner stone of a human rights-based politics in world communication.
One way to achieve this, would be through the adoption of a robust multilateral
convention that provides the basis for people centred political practices
in the issue-areas of world communication.
Such a multilateral convention on the Right to Communicate should not be
the common type inter-state accord. It should be an agreement between states
and non-state actors (all the various forms of CSOs as well as business
organisations).
The conference that would adopt the Convention would invite all United
Nations member states to send delegations that are representative of the
government, business interests and people's interests. The Convention text
would be signed by all members of delegations and would later be ratified
through tri lateral negotiations in the home countries of the delegations.
The idea of involving more than state players in issues of world politics
is not new. The International Labour Organisation employs the instrument
of tri-lateral negotiations in formulating its policies. The decision making
Labour Conferences are attended by delegations composed of representatives
of governments, employers and workers. In several Intergovernmental Organisations
there is also a noticeable trend towards bilateral bargaining between states
and business players. In recent years the non state business actors have
achieved a prominent position in such fora as the ITU, the GATT (now WTO)
and the OECD.
The multilateral convention would in principle be designed around a set of basic standards, rules for the enforcement of these standards and institutional mechanisms to implement the standards and rules of the Convention.
The Standards.
For the normative component of the right to communicate there are four
categories of binding standards. These are information rights, protection
rights, collective rights and participation rights.
All the standards in these four categories are treaty provisions and thus
contractual obligations for those parties ratifying the Convention. It
would seem realistic to propose that most norms would allow derogation
in situations of public emergence. However, it can be argued that some
right to communicate standards are peremptory and do not permit derogation.
Following the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) in Article 4.1., certain norms on discrimination are peremptory.
The ICCPR prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex,
language, religion or social origin. The formulation that discrimination
"solely" on these grounds is peremptorily prohibited could imply
that discrimination would not be prohibited if other grounds, such as political
affiliation, were also at play. By and large though it can be concluded
from the human rights treaties and the literature that substantial forms
of discrimination on the grounds mentioned in ICCPR, Art. 4.1. are binding
international law. (Hannikainen, 1988: 482). Article 4.2. refers to other
human rights norms that equally permit no derogation. There is no derogation
from ICCPR Articles 6, 7, 8 (1) &;(2), 11, 15, 16 and 18.
Under this absolute prohibition also the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion is recognized as non derogable.
This provision should be extended to the right to hold opinions. This can
be defended by arguing that the distinction between the freedom of thought
and the freedom to hold opinions is unreal. Moreover, Article 19.3 of the
ICCPR subjects the right to freedom of expression to certain restrictions,
but not the right to hold opinions.
It may well be that other dimensions of the right to communicate can not
be formulated in an equally absolutist manner. 'Even the seemingly absolute
guarantees of the First Amendment to the US Constitution are considerably
limited in practice by, for example, the clear and present danger test.
(Örücü, 1986: 38). One can even claim that the very act
of "converting a freedom into a legal right, is in effect a regulation
which fundamentally is also a limitation of a pure liberty". (Örücü.
1986: 40).
However, while admitting to certain limitations, these should be clearly
delimited. Limitations to the exercise of human rights can effectively
destroy these rights. Therefore it is important to identify the limit to
limitation. This is what Örücü has called the question of
the "irreducible minimum". (Örücü. 1986: 45).
"Every basic right requires a defined core and precise criteria for
identifying encroachments". (Örücü. 1986: 55. The guiding
principle here is that limitations are always formulated such as to increase
the level of protection. "One should always keep in mind that the
ultimate objective of the limitation clauses is not to increase the power
of a state or government but to ensure the effective enforcement of the
rights and freedoms of its inhabitants". (Kiss, 1981: 310).
In the light of this principle, limitations to human rights standards should
be confined to those "prescribed by international law and necessary
in democratic societies". The prescription by international law is
essential since domestic laws are often more restrictive. This is why the
Vienna Declaration is inadequate when it states in Article 39
"Underlining the importance of objective, responsible and impartial
information about human rights and humanitarian issues, the World Conference
on Human Rights encourages the increased involvement of the media, for
whom freedom and protection should be guaranteed within the framework of
national law". (June 25, 1993). In many countries the national legislation
allows for exceptions to the freedom of information which effectively erode
the standard itself. Article 19 (3) of the ICCPR uses the phrase that restrictions
"shall be only such as are provided by law". This is equally
unsatisfactory as it is too general. Evidently the law cannot violate any
right or freedom recognized the Covenant (Article 5.1.) [9] but it would
be desirable to add explicitly that the law must be in accordance with
the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
The provision that restrictions should be necessary in democratic societies
is used in Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950). In the Convention this is
linked with the notions of "in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary". These notions lend themselves to arbitrary interference
as "All of them are difficult to define and imply a measure of relativity
in that they may be understood differently in different countries, in different
circumstances, at different times". (Kiss, 1981: 295). In the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19) "national security,
public order (ordre public)..public health or morals" are permissible
grounds for limitation of the freedom of expression. All these principles
with the possible exception of public health are controversial and difficult
to interpret. Public morals for example suggests a uniform conception of
morality which does not exist. In most societies public morals tend to
reflect the moral concepts of the social elite.
National security is a permissible ground for limitation of the freedom
of expression. The meaning of the principle of national security is not
given and the obvious problem is that its interpretation will be determined
by those accused of violating the standard.
Information Rights.
The category "information rights" recognizes as binding norms
the right to hold opinions, the right to freedom of expression, the right
to receive, seek and impart information and ideas and the right to reply.
The right to hold opinions.
As argued above this should be a non-derogable standard.
The right to freedom of expression.
This standard implies the right to express opinions without interference
by public or private parties. In the conventional interpretation of this
right the emphasis is on governmental interference with the expressions
of citizens. However, human rights have both governmental and private aspects.
For example, "torture and kidnapping may be practised not only by
police but also by private groups, such as 'death squads'" (Nickel.
1987: 43). Conventional human rights thinking mainly focuses on the vertical
state/citizen relation. This ignores the possibility that concentration
of power in the hands of individuals can be as threatening as state power.
Whenever citizens pursue different economic interests, individual human
rights will be under serious threat. Citizens also need to be protected
against each other. When freedom is mainly protected from state interference,
the restrictions that fellow-citizens can impose upon access to information
are left outside the scope of the right. Human rights should have horizontal
effect. They should not only apply to state-citizen, but also to citizen-citizen
relationships In the case of information provision there should be protection
against information oligopolies organized by fellow-citizens.
This so called "Drittwirkung" or third party effect of human
rights means, for example, that information rights of people should be
free from interference by public as well as by private parties. Already
in the discussions leading to the human rights Covenants it was proposed
that interference by private parties should be barred. The proposal did
not acquire the status of legal provision. "An individual has the
right to freedom of opinion without interference by private parties as
well, and the state is obliged to ensure that freedom....It is doubtful,
however, whether the complex problem of protecting a person's opinion against
interferences by other individuals can be solved in this global and absolute
manner" (Partsch. 1981: 218).
In spite of these reservations, the defense of freedom of expression should
go beyond state interference and incorporate the reality of situations
in which private parties exercise power equivalent if not exceeding that
of the state.
The right to freedom of expression goes beyond this negative freedom from
interference, however, and includes the recognition of positive free speech
rights.
If the freedom of expression is interpreted in more than the classical
negative sense, the positive interpretation makes it necessary to define
this right not merely as a liberty but as a claim-right. A positive freedom
to communicate implies the claim-right to express opinions and the related
entitlement to facilities for the exercise of this right. The recognition
of freedom of expression as positive claim-right is particularly important
in situations where the voices of some people are systematically excluded.
In such situations the mere freedom from interference does not enable people
to participate in public communication (Barendt. 1985: 86).
The right to receive information.
People have the right to receive opinions, information and ideas. This
standard implies the right of people to be properly informed about matters
of public interest. This includes the right to receive information which
is independent of commercial and political interests, the right to receive
a range of information and cultural products designed for a wide variety
of tastes and interests.
The standard that people should be properly informed correlates with a
duty of information providers to impart information and ideas on matters
of public interest. The right to receive information is usually understood
as liberty and not as a claim right to the dissemination of information,
ideas and opinions. In this sense it remains a soft standard that prolongs
inequality between those who provide information and those who receive
it. A strong norm implies that the necessary facilities and opportunities
are provided to secure the reception of the widest possible choice of information
and ideas. This implies legal measures in situations where the channels
of communication are monopolized in order to secure the largest possible
number of autonomous channels.
The right to seek information.
This standard implies the right of access to information on matters
of public interests (held by public or private sources). [11]. The right
of access to information is in many Western countries protected through
the enactment of freedom of information laws. The basic rationale for these
statutes is that democracy requires an informed citizenry capable to judge
decisions made by governments. The difficult question however is whether
one can defend a "right to know" under freedom of information
standards if the speaker is unwilling to speak. "..recognition of
a right of access would then be tantamount to the imposition of constitutional
duties to disclose information" (Barendt. 1985: 108). In the case
of the unwilling speaker the right of access is difficult to uphold as
claim-right.
This is so "partly because the claims are generally made by a recipient
against an unwilling speaker, upon whom it is sought to impose a duty to
disclose information. It may be added that if such a claim were made against
a private person or body, rather than government, that person or body's
own First Amendment or privacy rights might be implicated" (Barendt.
1985: 112). Forcing an unwilling speaker to provide information may violate
the speaker's constitutional right to remain silent. It is easier to see
the grant of the right of access to information when the speaker is willing
but hindered in the execution of constitutional rights.
The right to impart information.
This standard includes the right to access public means of distributing
information, ideas and opinions. It provides for a
claim-right to individuals to speak. In other words it secures people's
access to the public media. The recognition that the public should receive
a multitude and variety of views held by ordinary people correlates with
the requirement that these ordinary people should speak via the media.
The right to distribute information necessarily includes fair and equitable
access to information distribution channels. This has consequences for
the tariffs of telecommunication and computer networks.
The right of reply.
This standard usually covers a range of situations in which people are
injured by inaccurate or offensive expressions disseminated to the general
public by means of public communication. In different legislations the
right to reply provides the entitlement to respond to critical opinions
or only to factual allegations. It would seem a wise course to follow Barendt
in his interpretation of the standard and "to confine rights of reply
to clear misstatements of facts, because it is easier to judge that one
has been committed than it is to conclude that an account is generally
distorted or contains an unfair attack" (Barendt, 1985: 101).
Protection Rights.
The category protection rights recognizes binding standards on privacy,
discrimination, presumption of innocence, independence, and deceit. Under
these standards the right to communicate should provide robust protection
against the abuse of public communication.
The protection of privacy.
The protection of privacy is a binding norm in international human rights
law (ICCPR, Art. 17). It reinforces the sovereignty of the individual over
a person-bound sphere of no intrusion. As a basic civil right is has not
been explicitly formulated in relation to public communication. The complexity
of the standard is obviously that it needs balancing against other norms
such as the right to seek information. This is further complicated by the
recognition that the protection of privacy can also imply the right not
to know. This is relevant in the context of genetic information and people's
right not to know that they are certain to develop some disease.
A robust formulation of the standard is in spite of these complications
needed in the light of a growing abuse of people's privacies in public
communication. It has become very common in many countries to obtain imagery
of people without their consent and use this for entertainment purposes.
An example is the use by TV stations of videomaterial taken from rescue
or emergency services. Privacy is also massively under threat in countries
where electronic surveillance of people is widely spread. In several countries
governments are preparing legislation to prohibit the encryption of telecommunication
and data traffic. This action against secret encoding of electronic communications
facilitates for police forces the interception of communications by criminals.
However, one of the results will be that people can no longer protect their
private use of electronic communication. This leaves privacy unprotected
and adds to the risks of the "surveillance" societies.
Basic to a right to communicate is the provision of the right to be protected
against interference with people's privacy by the media of mass communication
(publicly or privately owned), or by public and private agencies involved
with data collections. Also people's private communications should be protected
by law against interference by public or private parties.
Presumption of innocence.
People's right to respect for the standard of due process is very essential
in connection with the coverage of criminal cases by the media. This standard
implies that the media should not declare defendants guilty before courts
have established a verdict of guilt.
Discrimination.
An important normative standard of the right to communicate is the protection
against forms of communication that are discriminatory in terms of race,
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. Presently, there are
only explicit provisions against racially discriminatory communication
and against the advocacy of religious hatred (ICCPR, Art. 20, ICERD, Art.
4), but not on other forms of impermissible discrimination. The right to
communicate requires provisions on the protection against discrimination
on these other grounds as well.
People have the right to the protection by law against prejudicial treatment
of their person in the media of public communication. This right to be
treated in non-discriminatory ways implies that reporting by the media
should refrain from the use of images that distort the realities and complexities
of people's lives or that fuel prejudice by discriminatory descriptions
of people and situations, and that neglect the dignity and ability of opponents
in national, racial or ethnic conflict.
Deceit.
People have the right to be protected against misleading and distorted
information. This right concerns both the dissemination of news and the
provision of consumer information.
News dissemination should be based on accuracy and impartiality.
The provision of consumer information should be guided by the consumer's
right to protection of health and safety, to protection of economic interests,
the right of redress and the right of representation. Protection against
injurious information is especially relevant with regard to children. The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) provides on
this issue in Article 17 that States Parties shall encourage the development
of appropriate guidelines for the protection of the child from information
and material injurious to his or her well-being. These guidelines should
take into account the provisions on freedom of expression. The implication
of a standard on defective information is that people have the right to
hold information providers accountable for the accuracy of their information
and establish liability in case inaccurate information causes damage. This
should however not construe undue limits for the freedom of expression,
but if proven in a court of law that an information provider has wilfully
disseminated inaccurate or misleading information or has facilitated the
dissemination of such information by gross negligence people should have
recourse to compensation in case damage can be established.
Independence.
The information rights mentioned above require the protection of the
professional independence of employees of public or private communication
agencies. Professional journalists obviously need a form of protection
when they are out gathering information on dangerous missions. But they
also need protection against the interference by the owners and managers
of the mass media.
This implies the adoption of robust editorial statutes to protect journalists
against owners and managers of news media.
Collective rights.
Human right have both individual and collective dimensions. "There
are also rights which present individual and collective aspects. Freedom
of religion and freedom of expression are cases in point" (Van Boven,
1982: 54). Rights to language and religion are enjoyed in communities.
They cannot be implemented by protecting individual rights only. Also the
right to development demonstrates this relationship. UNGA Res. 34/46 of
1979, states that "the right to development is a human right and that
equality of opportunity for development is as much a prerogative of nations
as of individuals within nations". As a result, in the discussion
on the locus of human rights the individual and the community cannot be
separated. Individuals do not exist in isolation and are members of communities.
Communities do not exist outside the individuals that make up the collective.
Sanders concludes that "individual rights and collective rights are
distinct ideas, they are separate categories. Some individual rights can
be vindicated without reference to collective rights...But other basic
rights -such as freedom of religion- cannot be effectively vindicated without
the recognition of collective rights" (Sanders, 1991: 383).
This does not exclude that in different cultural and ideological traditions
there are conflicting emphases on the individual versus the collective.
There may be conflicts between individual and collective rights. This needs
careful balancing. For example, in the case of the collective right to
cultural autonomy of a group that practices sexual discrimination through
the practice of female circumcision. A guiding principle here is the provision
of Art. 5 of ICCPR and ICESR which prohibits any collective to engage in
acts that are "aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms"
recognized in the Covenants. The exercise of collective rights cannot imply
the destruction of individual rights.
In international law there has been a remarkable evolution from an exclusive
emphasis on sovereign nation-states, to individuals, to non state social
groups (peoples) and to humankind. There is still a strong tendency to
give priority to individual rights, and states tend to be against the recognition
of the collective rights of minorities as they usually favour assimilation
over cultural autonomy. Even so, there is increasing recognition of collective
rights.
Following Sanders (1991) collective rights are claims on behalf of communities
(for example ethnic minorities) that seek to protect their specific features,
such as cultural or linguistic characteristics. Sanders distinguishes collective
rights from group rights, "the major limitation of group rights is
that they only exist while the discrimination continues" (Sanders,
1991: 369). Groups are joined because of external discrimination, whereas
collectivities are joined by internal cohesiveness. "Collectivities
seek to protect and develop their own particular cultural characteristics"
(Sanders, 1991: 369). For example, "cultural minorities seek more
than the right of their individual members to equality and participation
within the larger society. They also seek distinct group survival"
(Sanders, 1991: 370).
The right to communicate should be recognized both as an individual and
as a collective right. To put the right exclusively in either category
limits unduly the rights of individuals as members of a community or the
rights of the collectivity. Collective claims require provisions on the
access to public communication on behalf of social groups. This is particularly
important as so many social groups, eg women, minorities, youth, tend to
be excluded from public communication.
In addition to this right of access for communities, collective claims
also include the right to development, and the recognition of communal
knowledge resources.
The recognition of the development principle in world communication politics
implies the entitlement to the development of communication infrastructures,
to the procurement of adequate resources, the sharing of knowledge and
skills, the equality of economic opportunities, and the correction of inequalities.
The communal claim to intellectual property recognizes that knowledge resources
are often a common good owned by a collective. Knowledge as common heritage
should be protected against its private appropriation by knowledge industries.
Collective claims also imply provisions on cultural identity, on the recognition
of cultural diversity and linguistic variety, or on the cultural autonomy
of communities.
Participation rights.
The idea of human rights has to extend to the social institutions that
facilitate the realization of fundamental standards. Human rights cannot
be realized without involving citizens in the decision-making processes
about the spheres in which freedom and equality are to be achieved. This
moves the democratic process beyond the political sphere and extends the
requirement of participatory institutional arrangements to other social
domains. In this extension also culture and technology should be subject
to democratic control. This is particularly important in the light of the
fact that current democratization processes around the world (the "new
world order" processes of deregulation) tend to delegate important
areas of social life to private rather than to public control and accountability.
Increasingly large volumes of social activity are withdrawn from public
accountability, from democratic control, and from the participation of
citizens in decision-making.
The rapidly proliferating privatization of information provision and cultural
production implies that more and more public space is taken over by corporate,
commercial interests. This "public to private" shift entails
that the decisive criteria of people's access to information and culture
are marketability and profitability.
The standard of extended participation implies the accessibility and affordability
of communication facilities and services, but also the availability of
communication skills. People have the right to acquire the skills necessary
to participate fully in public communication. This requires programmes
for communication literacy and critical media education. This right should
enable people to become critical users and producers of information and
culture.
Participation rights also entail people's right "freely to participate
in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits" (Article 27 of the UDHR).
The participation claim requires the creation of social and economic conditions
that will enable people "not only to enjoy the benefits of culture,
but also to take an active part in overall cultural life and in the process
of cultural development". The Unesco Recommendation on Participation
by the People at Large in Cultural Life and their Contribution to It (1976,
19th session of the General Conference)
which articulates this requirement, also provides that "participation
in cultural life presupposes involvement of the different social partners
in decision-making related to cultural policy...".
Participation extends beyond public participation in media production or
media management into the areas of public decision making. The 1982 Unesco
Expert Consultation in Bucharest, Rumania. February 9-12, 1982. (Right
to Communicate: Legal Aspects. Paris: Unesco) emphasized that it is essential
for a right to communicate, "that individuals and groups should be
able to participate at all relevant levels and at all stages in communication,
including the formulation, application, monitoring and review of communication
policies". This means that the standard requires that political practices
provide for people's participation in public policy making on the provision
of information, the production of culture or the production and application
of knowledge.
People have the right to participate in public decision making on the provision
of information. This means that there should be ample scope for public
participation in the formulation and implementation of public information
policies.
People have the right to participate in public decision making on the development
and utilisation of knowledge. This means that there should be ample scope
for public participation in the formulation and implementation of public
policies on the generation and application of knowledge.
People have the right to participate in public decision making on the preservation,
protection and development of culture. This means that there should be
ample scope for public participation in the formulation and implementation
of public cultural policies.
People have the right to participate in public decision making on the choice,
development and application of communication technology. This means that
there should be ample scope for public participation in the formulation
and implementation of public technology policies and the adoption of technology
standards.
Procedures.
The right to communicate needs robust procedures of enforcement.
The essential principles for this are the provision of effective remedy
against acts violating the right to communicate, the establishment of accountability
and the recognition of horizontal effect of remedial measures.
Crucial for the protection of human rights is the notion that there can
be no rights without the option of redress in case of their violation.
Rights and remedies are intrinsically related and where human rights concepts
do not provide accessible and affordable means of redress, they erode the
effective protection of the rights they proclaim. The old adagium of Roman
law states, "ubi ius, ibi remedium", where there is law there
is remedy. One can turn this around and propose that when no remedy is
available there is no law. People should be able seek effective remedy
when state or private parties obstruct their right to communicate.
Human rights not only require mechanisms of redress, they also imply that
those who rule on behalf of all are accountable, i.e. they are obliged
to justify their decisions on behalf of all. It is a basic requirement
of human rights standards that provisions on public policy imply a mechanism
for accountability. "The requirement that every citizen have a right
to take part in the conduct of public affairs is satisfied if appointed
officials are in some way responsible to elected representatives"
(Partsch, 1981: 239). This includes rules on accountability for public
policy makers and private parties involved in providing communication services,
information networks and cultural products.
The realization of human rights requires limitations on the power of the
state as well as a defense against "horizontal" abuses of fundamental
rights and freedoms.
The implication is that the right to communicate should be enforced also
vis-à-vis non state players. People should have access to effective
redress when private actors interfere with their privacy, distribute misleading
information, threaten their cultural autonomy, fail to protect their intellectual
property, or hamper their access to telecommunication and data networks.
On the basis of these principles (effective remedy, accountability and
horizontal effect) the procedures for individuals and communities to seek
redress have to contain at a minimum the following three components.
The recognition of the formal right to file complaints in case public or
private actors do not comply with the adopted norms.
The recognition of the competence of an independent tribunal that receives
complaints and with which also non state actors, both individually and
collectively, have 'locus standi'.
The recognition that the opinions of the tribunal are binding on those
who accept its jurisdiction.
Implementation mechanisms.
Binding norms and robust rules on their enforcement are still no guarantee
that all people will effectively enjoy a right to communicate. To improve
the chances of compliance with the norms and rules effective institutional
mechanisms are essential.
At a minimum this means the creation of an independent committee for monitoring
and review, a special rapporteur, and an independent tribunal to receive
complaints, to arbitrate and to adjudicate.
The independent committee could function much like the existing human rights
committees of the United Nations. The members of this Committee on the
Right to Communicate shall be elected and shall serve in their personal
capacity. The Committee members shall have experience in the field of human
rights and special competence in the different issue-areas of world communication.
Nominations will be made by all parties ratifying the Right to Communicate
Convention and elections shall be held at a review conference on the Convention.
The Committee will receive and consider communications from the parties
to the Convention about parties not fulfilling the obligations of the accord.
The Committee shall also review regular reports by parties to the convention
about their implementation of the obligations of the accord. The Committee
meetings shall not be closed and all documentation related to communications
from parties, review reports shall be accessible to all. The Committee
can appoint a special rapporteur on the right to communicate who can conduct
independent study and assessment of the implementation of obligations by
the parties involved. The Committee will also first receive all complaints
filed by individuals and communities that may require adjudication by the
Tribunal. Much like the European Commission of Human Rights, the Committee
receives, reviews and assesses complaints about alleged violations of the
right to communicate.
In this way the Committee acts as a filter for cases that be settled out of court and those that will go to the Tribunal. The Independent Tribunal shall function like the European Court of Human Rights as a body that is above all parties and that can take binding decisions. The Tribunal could be a special Chamber of the International Court of Justice. There is a provision for this in the Court's statute.
III. 2.2. Weaknesses of the human rights regime.
The universal validity.
An intriguing question in the human rights debate is how we should
interpret the universality of human rights. Does universality mean the
confinement to the universal validity of one human rights concept? Or could
universality mean the recognition of the concurrent existence of different
concepts? Does it mean that one interpretation of such standards as dignity,
equality or liberty is superior to other interpretations? The latter position
may obscure a 'human rights colonialism' that abuses human rights principles
in the justification of a preferred political position. The claim to universalism
can easily be used as a convenient instrument of an expansive foreign policy.
However, also the opposite, more relativist position is fraught with risks.
This position stresses the variety of cultural settings and the equality
of different interpretations of human rights. This has the intellectual
attraction of avoiding the fallacies of ethnocentrism. Yet, apart from
the consideration that relativism is the typical European intellectual
response to the Eurocentrism of colonial politics and science, the relativist
position obstructs any form of solidarity with the dissidents in other
cultural milieus. The importance of accepting a minimal standard of universal
validity is precisely the possibility to intervene in situations where
the victims cannot speak for themselves. It should be borne in mind that
the belief that there are no universally shared basic moral concepts is
usually proposed by elites that are not representative of ordinary people.
The relativist argument is in most countries around the world easily defeated
if one only inquires among the victims of human rights violations. As Donnelly
observes "ordinary citizens in country after country in the Third
World have found internationally recognized civil and political rights
essential to protecting themselves against repressive economic and political
elites" (Donnelly, 1993: 35).
This is what Ramcharan has called the democratic test of universality.
"Just ask any human being; Would you like to live or die? Would you
like to tortured or enslaved? If there is any critic of universality who
would argue that an individual would choose death to life, and serfdom
to freedom, let us hear from that critic" (Ramcharan, 1989: 26). One
could add to this that an even more convincing test of universalism is
the "victim test". If anyone is in doubt about the desirability
of the universal application of basic human rights, he or she should ask
the victims of human rights violations.
It is important that the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights
(1993) has reaffirmed the universality of human rights.
The final declaration states "The universal nature of human rights is beyond question". In the preparatory process of the Conference the universality concept had been challenged by several actors. In the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (June 9, 1993) the Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference made human rights subordinate to Islamic religious standards. The Declaration provided that the rights and freedoms it stipulated are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah. The Bangkok Declaration of the Asian preparatory conference stated that in the protection of human rights differences in national, cultural and religious backgrounds had to be taken into account. The Declaration recognized that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds. The Vienna Declaration recognized that universality does not equal uniformity and reminded that "the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind".
The inherent inadequacies.
The conventional human rights theories imply limitations to the understanding of human rights that erode the effective protection of the very basic claims they enunciate.
These theories are characterized by:
1. Conventionally, the concept of freedom is constructed in a negative
sense only. The classical right to freedom of expression is a good illustration.
It provides a freedom from interference of the state with the expression
of opinions, ideas, and information. Complete freedom, however, also encompasses
the freedom to emancipation and self-development. It implies a process
of human emancipation.
Conventional human rights conceptions do not provide this positive extension
of the basic norm of freedom. The "freedom to" (positive freedom)
points to a process of empowerment through which people liberate themselves
from all those forces that hinder them in taking decisions concerning their
own lives. This interpretation of freedom implies a process of emancipation
that should be guided by the basic norm of the sovereignty of individuals
and peoples. This concrete activity of human emancipation requires certain
social conditions.
The norm freedom in conventional human rights theory is Lockean in nature,
i.e. it is intrinsically related to the protection of private property.
The primary purpose of the norm is to protect property. It follows the
basic sense of property law in the Roman tradition, "dominium est
ius utendi et abutendi re sua quaterus iuris ratio patitur". In this
legal thinking freedom equates primarily the autonomy to use your property
provided no legal rule is violated. Freedom of the press, for example,
is the right to use the press within the limits of the law. There is no
social responsibility beyond the limits of the law. If the unhindered expansion
of property causes inequalities, then these are necessarily legitimate.
Freedom as the right to own and to protect the expansion of property does
not provide protection for those who do not own property, for example a
printing press or a TV station.
The basic assumption of conventional human rights thinking regarding the
freedom of information is that freedom of expression as such is given and
that there should only be protection against the danger of interference
by the state.
This assumption glosses over the fact that in the reality of unequal societies
this freedom does not exist for everyone. In almost every society individuals
and peoples are silenced.
Therefore, the right to freedom of expression would have to rather focus
upon the provision of access to the public expression of opinions than
on the prevention of restricting opinions.
2. Conventionally, the concept of equality is restricted to the political
sphere. It should however be extended to all those (socio-economic and
cultural) spheres that are essential to human emancipation and self-development.
Beyond the concern to realize equal voting rights in democratic societies,
for example, the need to create equal participation in cultural life, should
receive similar emphasis.
In an extended interpretation of "equality", the concept means
equal entitlement to the social conditions that are essential to emancipation
and self development.
Conventional human rights theories are biased towards a European tradition
in which it is assumed that all human beings are equally capable in asserting
their rights and in which the legal system is formally based upon the assumption
of the initiative of free citizens to defend their rights. These liberal
foundations of human rights law tend to neglect the reality of the widely
differential capacity to such initiative. In reality, the powerful are
always better in asserting their rights through litigation than the less
powerful.
Whenever the concept of equality is used this pertains largely to the Lockean
interpretation of "one rule for rich and poor" or to the Kantian
interpretation of non-discrimination (the law should treat all citizens
as equals).
In these interpretations the law recognizes a formal concept of equality
that is related to the perception of inequality as a form of social differentiation
which can and should be corrected.
Law is anti-discriminatory in the sense of repairing social disadvantage
by the equal treatment of unequals. This however does not change the structurally
unequal relations of power. The equal treatment can even reinforce the
inequality.
Providing equal liberties to unequal partners functions in the interest
of the most powerful.
In the conventional interpretation there is no provision for the use of
preferential measures that in situations of stark inequality may support
the "information-poor".
The liberal right to freedom of expression does not imply that everyone
acquires equal access to the means of expression.
An important element too is that the freedom of information in the liberal
tradition is not directly linked with the principle of equality. As a result
it offers insufficient support to the "information-poor"who claim
that their freedom of information can only be realised in case adequate
means of expression are available. The liberal interpretation does not
favour the use of preferential measures ("positive discrimination")
in situations of social inequality.
3. The realization of such norms as freedom and equality require certain
social conditions and it could be argued that no human being should have
privileged access over others to such conditions.
The recognition of human beings as free and equal implies the acceptance
that all human beings have valid claims to the social conditions of freedom
and equality.
Conventional human rights theories fail to address the issue of entitlement.
The recognition of such standards as freedom and equality implies that
all human beings are entitled to valid claims with regard to those (social)
conditions that are essential to their realization. Entitlement needs the
corollary of redress. Claims are implicitly undermined if there are no
accessible and affordable means of redress. Rights and remedies are intrinsically
related and where human rights theory does not provide adequate scope for
redress, it erodes the effective protection of the rights it proclaims.
This means that claims to an equal distribution of those material and social
resources that are necessary for people's (positive) freedom and emancipation,
should be enforceable and should not be left to voluntary arrangements.
The availability of conditions for people's self-development should not
be an act of charity or a lucky coincidence, but rather a legally enforceable
claim-right. Right to freedom of expression entails the right to the conditions
(the means) for the realization of this freedom. If we extend the definition
of freedom to include the (positive) freedom to, then the implication is
that the means through which this can be implemented should be available
and accessible.
If in a society the access to public media is obstructed for most people
due to economic or other constraints, the claim to freedom of expression
is invalidated.
In the conventional conception the right to freedom of expression is formulated
as a "liberty" and not as a "right" in the strict legal
sense. It represents a privilege of expression without interference, but
does not constitute a "claim-right", i.e. an entitlement with
a corresponding legal obligation.
In the strict legal sense a right implies a situation where a person is
entitled by legal process to compel another person to act as prescribed.
In cases where human rights are formulated as "liberties"
(as with the freedom of expression) it is not possible to impose a corresponding
duty on an other natural or legal person that can be forced by the subject
of a right to implement this right.
In fact many crucial human rights are rather liberties, providing certain
privileges to its holder that another person has no rights to interfere
with.
4. Conventional human rights thinking finds it difficult, if not impossible
to integrate the norm of individual uniqueness with the norm of social
equality. It perceives individual liberty and social equality as incompatible.
If, however, freedom is delinked from social equality, it tends to become
the liberty of a privileged and restricted group in society.
Precisely, the adoption of the norm of social equality, precludes the possibility
of some dominating others and thus increases freedom for all.
In the classical-liberal school of thought the freedom of information is
not directly linked with the standard of equality. As a result it deepens
the dependency of the "information-poor" upon the "information-privileged"
and decreases the freedom of the former.
If, on the other hand, social equality is delinked from liberty, the chances
that individual freedom is eroded are very real indeed. This may easily
justify situations where individual dissent has to concede to collective
aspirations and where the requirements of the common good become a threat
to individual development. In the conventional, socialist interpretation
of equality, the emphasis is very strongly on the state as the only legitimate
representative of people's needs and interests. Apart from the fact that
his tends to undermine the very standard of equality itself as it fosters
new vertical forms of social relations, it obstructs participatory democracy
and suppresses human uniqueness.
Just like information freedom delinked from social equality ends up with
"the few talking to the many, without the many talking back",
the emphasis on collectivism ends up with the same model. Only the "few"
change musical chairs. The many are in both models the same: disenfranchised
majorities.
5. Conventional human rights thinking mainly focuses on the vertical state/citizen relation. This ignores the possibility that concentration of power in the hands of individuals can be as threatening as state power. Whenever citizens pursue different economic interests, individual human rights will be under serious threat. Citizens also need to be protected against each other. Here the idea of human rights entails an ambivalent position on the state/civil society interaction. The realization of civil rights requires limitations on the power of the state, yet the realization of social and economic rights needs the authority of the state.
A solid protection of human rights needs both a civil defense against the powers of the state as well as the support of the state in cases of 'horizontal' abuses of fundamental rights and freedoms. The conventional interpretation offers insufficient protection against the control of information and media by a limited group of citizens. Since freedom is mainly protected from state interference, the restrictions that fellow-citizens can pose upon access to information are left outside the scope of the right. The lack of horizontal effect is a major weakness in conventional human rights interpretations.
6. The idea of human rights has to extend to the social institutions
(the institutional arrangements) that would facilitate the realization
of fundamental standards.
Human rights cannot be realized without involving citizens in the decision-making
processes about the spheres in which freedom and equality are to be achieved.
This moves the democratic process beyond the political sphere and extends
the requirement of participatory institutional arrangements to other social
domains. It claims that also culture and technology should be subject to
democratic control.
This is particularly important in the light of the fact that current deregulation
processes tend to delegate important areas of social life to private rather
than to public control and accountability. Increasingly large volumes of
social activity are withdrawn from public accountability, from democratic
control, and from the participation of citizens in decision making.
Re-thinking human rights would entail the following components:
Freedom.
The standard of human freedom is extended from a negative interpretation
only to include a positive orientation. This does not minimize the essential
significance of 'negative freedom'. This remains a critical requirement
for the realization of human emancipation. It is not sufficient, however.
Provisions need to be designed that support people's empowerment and emancipation.
This demands for example the availability and accessibility of the concrete
resources that are needed for people's participation in public communication.
This implies the need to formulate in addition to the existing information
right a much more comprehensive right to communicate.
Equality.
The standard equality is extended to take into account the very real
inequalities that prevail in most societies. It is essential to recognize
that the realisation of basic human rights in situations of social inequality
may demand the unequal treatment of unequals and may thus require preferential
measures for the large group of the "information-poor". In the
real world, some individuals/groups have more access to information and
means of communication than others and some are capable of silencing others
very effectively. It needs to be acknowledged that social inequality exists
on many different levels. Beyond rights to political equality, rights to
informational and cultural equality should be taken equally seriously.
Redress.
Human rights in the field of information should be formulated as legal
claim-rights and solid procedures for redress should be designed. In situations
of social inequality it is inadequate to award a right to expression without
the concurrent obligation on powerful social actors not to silence weaker
social actors.
Freedom and equality.
Individual liberty and social equality have to be integrated.
This requires enforceable provisions that support a universal access to
communications resources, and transparent rules (with strong provisions
for appeal) on "common good" restrictions on individual expression.
Horizontal effect.
Human rights should have horizontal effect. They should not only apply
to state-citizen, but also to citizen-citizen relationships In the case
of information provision they should offer protection against information
oligopolies organized by fellow-citizens.
Institutional extension.
An effective human rights regime requires the extension of such fundamental
standards as freedom and equality beyond the political realm. This implies
that forms of participatory democracy have to be designed for policymaking
in the fields of information provision, development and application of
information technology, and the production of culture. This implies the
need to design provisions to enable civil society to take back public space.
The People's Communication Charter articulates essential rights and
responsibilities that ordinary people have in relation to their cultural
environment. It represents an attempt to redress some of the weaknesses
inherent in the conventional human rights regime. It aspires to a democratic
and sustainable organisation of the world's communication structures and
information flows.
It is abundantly clear that these great ideas cannot be simply implemented
by drafting and revising a text.
The text constitutes merely a point of reference for a much needed civil
activism that targets what arguably is a very central social domain.
It may provide the inspiration for the real work that still needs to be
done: the awareness-building, the lobbying, the mobilizing,
the failures, and the re-trials.
Amsterdam, August 19, 1997.
1. Reported in the International Herald Tribune of February 1, 1991.
2. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless
of frontiers".
Article 19. para 1 and 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights:
"1. Everyone shall the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print,
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice".
3. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation".
Article 17 para 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights:
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on
his honour and reputation".
4. Article 11 para 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
"Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which
he has the guarantees necessary for his defence".
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law".
5. Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination:
"States Parties....(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law
all dissemination of ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred, incitement
to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement
to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or
ethnic origin...."
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized
and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination....".
Article 20 para 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights:
"Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited
by law".
6. Article 20 para 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights:
"Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law".
7. Article 17 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child:
"States Parties recognize the important function performed by the
mass media and shall ensure that the child has access to information and
material from a diversity of national and international sources, especially
those aimed at the promotion of his or her social, spiritual and moral
well-being and physical and mental health. To this end, States Parties
shall:
(a)Encourage the mass media to disseminate information and material of
social and cultural benefit to the child....
(b)Encourage international co-operation in the production, exchange and
dissemination of such information and material from a diversity of cultural,
national and international sources;
(c)Encourage the production and dissemination of children's books;
(d)Encourage the mass media to have particular regard to the linguistic
needs of the child who belongs to a minority group or who is indigenous"
8. Article I para 1 of the UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International
Cultural Co-operation:
"Each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and
preserved".
Article IV para 4 of the UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International
Cultural Co-operation:
"To enable everyone to have access to knowledge, to enjoy the arts
and literature of all peoples, to share in advances made in science in
all parts of the world and in the resulting benefits, and to contribute
to the enrichment of cultural life".
9. Article 3 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide:
"The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public
incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity
in genocide."
10. Article III of the International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid:
"International criminal responsibility shall apply, irrespective of
the motive involved, to individuals, members of organizations and institutions
and representatives of the State, whether residing in the territory of
the State in which the acts are perpetrated or in some other State, whenever
they:
(a) Commit, participate indirectly incite or conspire in the commission
of the acts mentioned in article II of the present Convention:".
Article II enumerates various crimes in relation with apartheid.
11. Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women:
"States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and
all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women".
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